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Summary  findings
Men and women may be affected differently by the  decade. Labor redundancies are concentrated in male-
transition from central planning to a market economy  dominated sectors, such as mining, transport,  and
and especially by the privatization and restructuring  of  construction;  redundancies are smaller in female-
state-owned enterprises. After briefly reviewing the  dominated sectors, such as footwear, textiles, and
international evidence on this issue, Rama looks at the  garments. Moreover, temporary and short-term contracts
recent experience of Vietnam and the prospects of its  are more prevalent in female-dominated sectors,
new reform program.  suggesting demand for women's work.
During the massive downsizing in Vietnam in the early  Assistance programs for redundant workers have
1990s, many more women than men were laid off.  potential gender biases. Rama shows that separation
Women withdrew from the labor force in larger numbers  packages defined as a multiple of earnings favor men
than men after separation, but the difference nearly  more, while lump-sum packages favor women more.
vanished after a year. Economic reforms were associated  Packages based on seniority are roughly gender neutral,
with a considerable decline in the gender gap in earnings,  but require a substantially higher expenditure to reach
both in the state sector and outside it.  the same acceptance rate as the other two.
Women are less likely to be retrenched  in large
numbers in the downsizing in the early part of this
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translations.1.  Introduction
Because development  strategies are  not  gender-neutral, a  comprehensive economic
reform program can be expected to affect men and women differently. Some of the effects may
be indirect.  For instance, moving from central planning to a  market-oriented economy may
change the labor market payoffs to education, and the educational attainment of men and women
is not necessarily the same.  Similarly, trade liberalization may change the composition of labor
demand, hence the  gender structure of  employment.  Other effects  are much more direct,
especially when the reform program includes massive public sector downsizing.  The burden of
job separations may not be borne evenly by male and female workers. And the welfare impact of
these separations could differ by gender too.
While it is increasingly accepted that policy making has to pay especial attention to social
impacts, including gender impacts, the conceptual framework and the information needed to
assess the gender impact of reform programs in general, and of public sector downsizing in
particular, are not readily  available.  Gender issues have been  analyzed in  some depth in
industrial  countries,  but  much  less  is  known  about  developing  countries  and  transition
economies.  At  the risk  of  simplifying, the  scant literature on  the gender implications of
economic reforms, and especially of public sector downsizing, can be  summarized under the
form of four propositions. The empirical support available varies depending on the propositions,
but it can never be considered overwhelming.
First, reforms aimed at shifting the economy from central planning and self-reliance to
market orientation and exposure to international  markets should offer better prospects of salaried
employment for women.  This is because capital-intensive, heavy industries are more likely to
2employ male workers, whereas labor-intensive,  light industries are more likely to employ female
workers.  Heavy industries are favored by state-led development strategies, as a  symbol of
national pride  and  self-reliance.  Capital-intensive industries are also  promoted by import-
substitution policies, as the  latter shift the allocation of resources away  from a  developing
country's  comparative advantage, which rests on the abundance of unskilled labor.  Export-
oriented growth, on the other hand, relies on light, labor-intensive industries.  Support for the
hypothesis that economic reforms are associated with a feminization of employment is mainly
provided by the East and South Asian experiences  (World Bank, 2001).
Second, economic reforms could also affect the gender gap in labor earnings, although
the sign of this effect is a priori ambiguous.  A frequent outcome of the transition to a more
market-oriented economy has been the "decompression" of labor earnings in general, and of
wages in particular.  This decompression results from increases in the market returns to various
skills and productivity characteristics.  If women have a lower level of education than men, the
gender gap in labor earnings could increase. This has been observed in countries like Russia and
the Ukraine (Rodgers, 1999).  On the other hand, economic reforms also reduce the scope for
employers to "discriminate" against women. Faced with increased competition, employers have
a stronger incentive to hire more lower-priced female labor, which in turn should reduce the
gender gap in earnings. The experience of Mexico during a recent period of trade liberalization
is consistent with this hypothesis (Artecona and Cunningham, 2000).
The third proposition emerging from the existing literature is that women are mcre likely
to experience a larger drop in eamings than men in the event of downsizing.  The gender gap in
labor earnings tends to be smaller in the public sector than out of it, implying a bigger loss, in
relative terms, for  separated women.  The gender gap  in  private sector earnings has been
3documented by several studies dealing with developing countries (for instance, Psacharopoulos
and Tzannatos, 1992, and Appleton, Hoddinott and Krishnan, 1999).  Other studies suggest that
the drop in earnings subsequent to public sector downsizing is larger for women than for men
(see Mason, 1997, and Rama, 1999). Moreover, the public sector usually offers benefits that are
highly valued by women, such as maternity leave, flexibility in the hours of work, and daycare
facilities.  These benefits are more rare in the private sector, and generally unavailable in the
informal sector, where most of the new jobs taken by separated workers are.  The loss in total
compensation experienced by women is thus potentially larger than the more easily observable
loss in earnings.
Finally, the fourth proposition is that women are more likely than men to withdraw from
the labor force after downsizing.  From this perspective, the drop in earnings is even larger than
suggested by the previous paragraph, as many separated women end up with no earnings at all.
However, the labor force withdrawal is sometimes  voluntary. A tracer study of separated central
bank employees in Ecuador found that the earnings loss was significantly larger for women than
for men.  But the study also included questions on subjective wellbeing, taking into account the
compensation received, the change in leisure time associated with the withdrawal from the labor
force, and other adjustments in the life of the household subsequent to the job separation.  The
tracer study found that the net change in wellbeing was not significantly different for men and
women (Rama and MacIsaac, 1999).
While these propositions provide interesting insights on the expected gender impacts of
economic reforms, and especially of public sector downsizing, they are not detailed enough to
inform economic policy in a particular country at a particular point in time.  Depending on the
magnitude of the gender impacts on employment, earnings and wellbeing, additional measures
4may be needed. These  measures  could  be specific  programs  targeted  to women;  particuilarly  to
those  who  lose  their  jobs as a result  of downsizing.  They  could  also take the form of adjustments
to specific  aspects  of the economic  reform  program  that are gender-neutral  on the surface,  but do
have  different  impacts  on men  and women.
The aim of this article  is to illustrate  some  of the additional  analyses  that could  precede
the launching  of economic  reforms  entailing  public  sector  downsizing  in a developing  country  or
a transition  economy,  in order  to asse&$  their gender  impact. These analyses  aim at predicting
how trends in salaried employment  by gender will be affected by the reform program, at
quantifying  the potential  changes  in the gender  gap in labor  earnings,  at evaluating  the impact  of
the operation  on  job losses  by gender,  and at assessing  whether  the programs  that are in place  to
assist and compensate  redundant  workers  affect the wellbeing  of men and women diffierently.
Some  of these analyses  rely on barely more than educated  conjectures,  whereas  others require
more rigorous quantitative  work.  Despite their individual  weaknesses,  these analyses may
provide  a sensible  picture  of the effects  of public  sector  downsizing.
The example  chosen in the article is that of Vietnam. The interest of this country  is
twofold. First,  a major downsizing  operation  is about  to be launched,  whereby  up to 5,740  state-
owned enterprises  (SOEs) will be liquidated,  divested or restructured  over the next decade.
Those  enterprises  currently  employ  1.68  million  workers,  amounting  to roughly  5 percent of the
Vietnamese  labor force. About  450,000  of these workers  may lose their jobs, and many others
may  take early retirement. Job losses could  in principle  affect  women disproportionately.  This
article  was actually  prepared  as an input for the Vietnamese  reform  program. Second,  the data
available  in the case of Vietnam  is similar to the data that can be found in other developing
5countries and transition economies.  From this point of view, the article could also be relevant
when designing public sector downsizing programs elsewhere,
2.  Impact on Salaried Employment
The potential gender impact of the reform program on  salaried employment can be
assessed based on the actual implications of the economic reforms undertaken in Vietnam over
the last few years.  In 1986, the e  National Congress of the Communist Party adopted the Doi
Moi, or renovation process.  Since then, several reform policies have been implemented, and the
country has been moving steadily from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy.  In
1991, the pace of reform was dramatically accelerated by the disintegration of the Soviet Union,
which entailed the loss of the main trading partner and about one billion rubles a year in aid. The
result was a collapse in economic growth and high inflation, peaking at about 450 percent per
year.  Confronted  with this situation, the government decided to launch a massive restructuring
of  loss-making SOEs, leading to  the separation of about one-third of the public enterprise
workforce.
Elements for an assessment of the gender impact of these reforms can be found in a
variety of studies on the condition of women in Vietnam (see the overview by Long et al., 2000,
and the comprehensive bibliography by Pham, 2000).  Those studies do not always allow to
disentangle the  effects of  economic reforms from  those  of  other, more permanent factors
affecting gender relations. Still, they prove interesting when combined with data on employment
from the 1992-93  and 1997-98 rounds of the Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VLSS).
6One striking fact,  when  analyzing the VLSS  data, is  the  slow  growth of  salaried
employment among women, relative to men.  This fact is at odds with the first proposition
emerging from the literature on the gender implications of economic reforms, according to which
women  should  face  better  employment prospects that  men.  It  is  worth  noting that  the
employment pattern is not due to a decline in female participation rates, like the one observed in
many countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  Labor force participation rates
are very high for women in Vietnam, and they have increased over the 1990s, as shown by Table
1. At the end of the decade, the percentage of women of working age who were employed was
almost the same as the percentage of men.  Moreover, women were less likely than men to be
unemployed. Despite all this, the number of women in wage employment expanded at a much
slower pace than the number of men. The growth rates between 1992-93 and 1997-98 were 10.1
and 25.6 percent respectively.
One natural candidate to explain this striking trend is, of course, the massive downsizing
program of the early 1990s. The total number of employees in the state sector was reduced from
3.86 million in 1985 (about 15 percent of the labor force) to 2.92 million in 1992 (or 9 percent).
As public sector  jobs account for a larger share of wage employment among women than among
men, even a gender-neutral downsizing would lead to a larger drop in wage employment (in
relative terms) for women than for men.  In the case of Vietnam, downsizing was not gender-
neutral, though, as roughly 70 percent of the separated workers were female.  In 1990-91 alone,
some 553,000 women workers were laid off from SOEs (Beresford, 1994). This figure amounts
to 19.7 percent of all female wage employment in 1992-93.
Over time, however, the first proposition emerging from the literature is likely to be
verified in Vietnam as well. In 1998, SOEs represented 46.2 percent of industrial GDP, but they
7accounted for only 24.2 percent of industrial employment. On the other hand, private firms in
manufacturing were clearly labor intensive and export-oriented (Belser, 2000).  The economic
reform program of Vietnam should lead to a gradual contraction of the former sector, and a fast
expansion of the latter.  Belser estimates that given Vietnam's endowment of natural and human
resources, manufacturing exports could triple over a  five-year period, generating on average
about 300,000 direct jobs every year. Jobs in exporting firms often carry the benefits associated
with participation in the formal sector of the economy.
A majority of the jobs to be created as a result of the reform program could be held by
women. A survey of 1,294 enterprises carried out by MOLISA (1998) provides valuable insights
in this respect.  The sample included 408 SOEs, 761 private firms and  125 enterprises with
foreign investment capital. While the sample was not intended to be representative, all of the
enterprises in it were presumably formal. An interesting finding of this survey is that the highest
proportion of  female  workers can be  found  in  private  firms  (55.6  percent),  followed by
enterprises with foreign investment capital (48.8 percent).  The lowest proportion, 39.7 percent,
is in  SOEs.  This ranking is observed despite a government policy that encourages SOEs to
employ as many female workers as possible (ILO, 1998).  If the ranking holds over time, a
contraction of the state sector, followed by an expansion of private firms and enterprises with
foreign investment capital, should lead to better employment  opportunities for women.
3.  Impact  on Labor  Earnings
Mincerian equations, or earnings functions, are a  useful tool to  assess the impact of
economic reforms on the gender gap in labor earnings. These functions, usually estimated using
8records from household  surveys,  link (the log of) individual  labor earnings to a variety of
individual characteristics,  such as  educational attainment, work experience or  region of
residence. Earnings  functions  can be estimated  separately  for men  and for women,  in which  case
the gender  gap in earnings  can be decomposed  into two effects:  differences  in endowments  (for
example,  in educational  attainment)  and differences  the in returns to these endowments  (in the
example, the increase in  earnings associated  with qne additional year of education).  An
intuitively  simpler  way to assess the gender  gap is to estimate  the earnings  function pooling
together  workers  of both sexes,  but including  a gender  dummy  among  the explanatory  variables.
The coefficient  multiplying  this variable  indicates  whether  two workers who have the average
educational  attainment,  experience,  etc.,  but are of different  sexes,  have  different  earnings.
Table  2 reports  the coefficients  of these simpler  earnings  functions  at two points in the
reform process of Vietnam.  These coefficients  were estimated  using individual  records for
salaried  workers of both sexes, obtained  from the 1992-93  and 1997-98  rounds of the VLSS.
Many things might have changed between these two periods.  Differences in  the  skill
composition  of the labor force,  in the terms of trade faced by the country,  in the world interest
rate,  or even  in weather  conditions,  could  account  for some  of the change  in the coefficients.  But
in the case of Vietnam, the effects of these genuinely  exogenous  differences  are probably
dwarfed  by those  of the economic  reforms  launched  under  the Doi  Moi.
The earnings functions  reported in Table 2 do not correct for potential  self-selection
biases. Women  who hold salaried  jobs could be different,  in some systematic  way, from other
women. For example,  they could be more talented. And the same applies to men who have
salaried  jobs.  More talented  workers are also likely to have a higher educational  attainment.
Earnings  functions  could  attribute  to educational  attainment  what is in reality due to talent,  thus
9biasing upwards the  corresponding  coefficient.  The coefficients on  other  individual
characteristics  could  be biased as well. But if the self-selection  biases  are stable over time,  the
comparison between the  coefficients obtained for  1992-93 and  1997-98 should still be
informative  regarding  the changes  elicited  by economic  reforms.
Econometric  techniques  can be used to cotrect  for self-selection.  These  techniques  rely
on assumptions  regarding  the self-selection  mechanism  at work,  and are particularly  effective  if
one or several  variables  exist  that affect  the selection  into salaried  work,  but not labor earnings.
Unfortunately,  there are no obvious variables  with these characteristics. For this article,  the
1992-93 and 1997-98 earnings functions  were re-estimated  using the Heckman selectivity
correction,  without  using additional  explanatory  variables  for the selection  into salaried  work.
The results  yielded  no evidence  of significant  self-selection  bias. The corrected  coefficient  on
educational  attainment  was slightly  lower  in 1992-93,  and slightly  higher in 1997-98,  compared
to the ordinary  least square  estimhates.
According  to the second  proposition  emerging  from  the literature  on the gender  impact  of
economic  reforms,  an increase  in the returns  to education  should  be expected. In Vietnam,  this
increase  is observable  both in SOEs and in the private sector, as shown by the coefficients
multiplying  the education  variable in Table 2.  Although  returns to education  appear to be
substantially  lower  than in other countries,  they almost  doubled  over a five-year  period.  For
instance,  in the private sector the contribution  of each additional  year of education  to earnings
increased  from 2.34 percent to 3.98 percent. Because  women have lower levels of education
than  men,  this  "decompression"  of earnings  must  have  been  at their disadvantage.  However,  this
effect is probably small, as the difference  in average  levels of education  between men and
10women is only about one year.  The earnings decompression could then be associated with an
increase in the earnings gender gap of less than two percentage points.
On the other hand, the  1990s witnessed a  substantial decline in the gap in earnings
between men and  women,  as  measured by  the coefficient multiplying the  gender dummy
variable.  As expected, Table 2 shows that the gender gap in earnings is larger in the private
sector than in the public sector.  But it also shows a dramatic decline in this gap in the two
sectors.  Other things equal, in 1992-93 women workers in the private sector used to earn 38.9
percent less (= [exp(-0.4919)-l]*100) than men. By 1997-98  the gap had shrank to 26.1 percent
(= [exp(-0.3025)-1]*100). The trend is similar in SOEs, with the gap falling from 28.8 to 18.5
percent. This second effect of economic reforms more than offsets the effect of increased returns
to education.  It follows that the reforms launched under the Doi Moi have reduced the gender
gap in earnings, and this trend can be expected to continue with the new wave of reforms that is
about to be launched.
Admittedly, the  comparisons in  Table 2  refer to  wage  earners only,  as  data on the
earnings of the self-employed are not available. Few of the women who lost their jobs in SOEs
are likely to have found salaried jobs, and many actually ended up doing unpaid work, as shown
by Table 3.  The figures in this table were constructed by Rodgers (1999), using data from the
1992-93 round of the VLSS.  This survey contains detailed information on employment at the
time of the survey, employment in the previous 12 months, and work performed prior to the job
held in those 12 months.  Although many SOE workers lost their jobs before the survey took
place, the recall questions on employment  history cover at least some of the retrenchment period.
Rodgers' analysis focuses on respondents who report a change in jobs.  The top panel of Table 3
11refers to job  switches that took place within the 12 months preceding the survey, whereas the
bottom panel refers to switches prior to those 12 months.
The results in Table 3 show that during the first 12 months after a job change many more
women than men withdrew from the labor force.  But to a large extent, this withdrawal appears
to be voluntary, as unemployment rates are low for all groups.  At a first glance, this result is
consistent with the fourth proposition emerging from the literature on the gender impact of
economic reforms in developing countries.  However, after 12 months, the share of men and
women out of the labor force becomes substantially smaller, and actually comparable to the
share observed for the population at large (see Table 1).  It is thus unlikely that the downsizing
operation about to  be  launched  in  Vietnam will have a  lasting effect  on the  labor force
participation rate of women.
The decline in the share out of force observed after 12 months is largely associated with
an increase in unpaid work.  This is actually the main activity of most of those who change jobs,
regardless of whether those jobs were in the public sector or out of it.  Table 2 also reveals a
substantial increase in the share doing paid work.  This share is roughly twice as large after 12
months from a job change than within the immediate 12 months.  But paid work remains more
prevalent among men than among women, even after 12 months, regardless of whether  jobs were
in the public sector or out of it.
4.  Impact  on Job Losses
In the early 1990s, public sector downsizing affected women disproportionately.  Will
this be the case again in the early 2000s? According to Hyun et al. (2000), "it is safe to assume
12that the gender division of labor in these industries will remain largely the same if privatized".
There are some grounds to share this assumption. As Table 4 shows, the average characteristics
of men and  women employed in  SOEs are similar,  This  table  was constructed based on
individual  records from the sample of the 1997-98 round of the VLSS. This sample contains 451
persons whose main occupation was in an SOE.  Although the 1997-98 VLSS sample was not
drawn proportionally, there are no reasons to believe that its sampling fractions are correlated
with the individual characteristics of SOE workers.  Therefore, the figures reported in Table 5
are non-weighted averages across those 451 persons.
According to Table 4, female SOE workers differ from male SOE workers in two main
respects.  First, and not surprisingly, they eam less.  The annual basic salary is more than one
million dong lower for men than for women.  When bonuses, allowances and payments in kind
are taken into account, the gap climbs to roughly two million dong.  And it widens by an extra
half a million dong when extra earnings in secondary and tertiary occupations are considered.
Given the similarity of average age, education and seniority, this gap confirms the existence of a
"gender gap" in labor earnings, as had already been suggested by the regressions in Table 2.  The
second difference  between male and female SOE workers is that the former are more likely to be
married.
These two differenses could have opposite effects on the probability of being declared
redundant.  Other things  equal,  female workers are "cheaper".  From  a  purely economic
perspective,  it could therefore be in the interest of the SOEs, or their new owners, to cut on male
employment first.  On the other hand, male workers are more likely to have dependents, and
there could be an understandable reluctance to fire a "breadwinner". From a social perspective,
then, the SOEs or their new owners could prefer to cut on female employment first. It is difficult
13to tell, on a priori grounds, whether the economic or the social considerations will prevail in
practice.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to analyze the link between labor redundancy and gender
at a disaggregated level, because there are no matched data for enterprises and individuals in
Vietnam.  In particular, none  of the available enterprise databases provides a breakdown of
employment by gender.  However, data for enterprises and individuals can be matched at the
sector level.  For this article, the female share of employment by sector of activity was estimated
based on the 451 persons whose main occupation  was in an SOE, according to the sample of the
1997-98 round of the VLSS. The source of the data was thus the same as in Table 4.  The female
share of employment was in turn matched to sectoral indicators of labor redundancy, estimated
using enterprise-level  data. The results are reported in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1 plots the female share of employment in SOEs against the fraction of workers
who are redundant, by sector of activity.  The fraction of workers redundant was estimated by
Belser and Rama (2000), comparing employment levels across enterprises with different degrees
of state ownership. The comparison by Belser and Rama controls for sector of activity, region
and age of the enterprise, among other variables. It measures the drop in employment that would
occur if all SOEs in the sector were to operate as privately owned enterprises.  In practice, the
number of job separations will be smaller than suggested by this fraction, as some enterprises are
bound to remain (at least partially) in state hands, others will be divested or restructured only
gradually, and some labor redundancies will be handled through natural  attrition.  Still, the
indicator in the vertical axis of Figure 1 should be highly correlated with the (smaller) fraction of
workers who could be declared redundant.
14Figure 1 shows that over-staffing is not prevalent in  sectors of activity where female
employment  is dominant. Belser and Rama found that SOEs in footwear and leather, in food and
beverages, and in textile and garments are not substantially (or not at all) over-staffed compared
to their private sector counterparts. These are the sectors of activity were female employment is
more  prevalent.  On  the  other  hand,  a  vast  majority of  SOE workers  in  transportation,
construction,  oil  and  gas,  mining,  and  machinery  and  equipment  are  redundant.  Male
employment is  dominant  in  these  sectors.  Overall, Figure  1  reveals a  strongly  negative
association between female employment and labor redundancy.  The  correlation coefficient
between these two variables is -0.92.
The nature of the labor contracts used in different sectors of activity also suggests that
female workers are in higher demand than male workers.  Figure 2 plots the female share of
employment against the fraction of SOEs workers who are employed on short-term or temporary
contracts, by sector of activity.  Short-term and temporary contracts usually reveal precarious
employment conditions. SOEs, or their new owners, could discontinue these contracts on a short
notice, by simply not renewing them. Being employed on a short-term or temporary contract can
thus be seen as an indication of being productive, from the point of view of the enterprise.  It
follows that most of the truly redundant workers must be employed on either long-term or open-
ended contracts.  Information on the fraction of workers who are on short-term or temporary
contracts was drawn from the establishment database constructed by Belser and Rama.
Figure 2 shows that short-term and temporary contracts are prevalent in the footwear and
leather sector, where more than eighty percent of the workers are female.  At the other end, less
than a quarter of all workers are on short-term or temporary contracts in sectors such as mining,
transportation, construction, oil and gas, and machinery and equipment, where male employment
15is dominant.  Other sectors, such as food and beverages, and textile and garments, occupy an
intermediate position.  Overall, Figure 2 suggests that a positive association exists between
female employment on the one hand, and short-term and temporary contracts on the other hand.
In this case, the correlation coefficient is 0.78.
It is important to stress that the correlations revealed by Figures 1 and 2 do not arise by
construction.  In estimating the fraction of SOE workers who would become redundant, Belser
and Rama do not use information on the female share of employment (which is not available at
the enterprise level) nor on the fraction of workers who are on short-term or temporary contracts.
The variables in the horizontal and vertical axes of Figures I  and 2 are, therefore, generated
independently. In the case of Figure 1, they even come from different sources, as the estimates
by Belser and Rama rely on an enterprise database, which reports no gender breakdown, whereas
the female share of employment comes form the sample of the 1997-98 round of the VLSS,
which is a household survey. It is thus safe to conclude that there are fewer redundancies among
women than among men.
5.  Gender  Biases  in Assistance  Programs
Regardless of the number of female workers to be separated from their jobs, the programs
available to assist those who are redundant should not suffer from a gender bias. In some cases,
those programs amount to nothing. Workers whose short-term or temporary contracts are not
renewed at expiration do not get cash compensation, training or any other form of assistance.
But even "nothing" is not necessarily gender-neutral. The third proposition emerging from the
literature on the gender impact of public sector downsizing is that women are more likely to
16experience a larger drop in earnings than men in the event of separation.  Providing the same
amount of support (including no  support at all)  to separated men and  women is  therefore
equivalent to accepting a bigger loss in earnings for the latter. If large numbers of workers hired
on short-term or  temporary contracts were to be  separated in  Vietnam, despite their lower
redundancy rates, women could suffer disproportionately.
As  regards  workers on  long-term or permanent contracts,  a  kcey component of  the
assistance  strategy considered  by  the  government of  Vietnam  is  early  retirement.  This
component is regulated by decree 93/1998/ND-CP,  which allows workers to get old-age pension
up to five years prior to the "normal" retirement age.  In Vietnam, the normal retirement age is
60 years for males and 55 years for females. The old-age pension is reduced by one percent for
each year below the normal retirement age.  The reduction in retirement age allowed by decree
93/1998/ND-CP is the same for both sexes, so that on the surface this assistance program for
redundant workers does not discriminate against women.
In Vietnam, however, the case has been made that women are penalized by their lower
retirement age.  Being forced to  retire, the argument goes, prevents women workers from
reaching high echelons in the hierarchy of the enterprises and agencies they work for.  This
argument is articulated by the Vietnam Women's Union (1998), based on a survey conducted in
Haiphong. The sample of this survey includes 302 persons, equally divided by gender. Most of
the respondents  worked in  administrative and  production units  of  SOEs  and  government
agencies; the rest were retirees. This sample is not representative, and the interpretation of some
of the questions asked by the survey is difficult.  Still, some of the results of this survey are
interesting on their own.
17Female respondents are more inclined than men to believe that early retirement creates
inequalities, and they are also more numerous to claim that it adversely affects the status of
women. From a "social" point of view, the early retirement program could thus be detrimental to
women.  However, this perception is voiced by less than half of the interviewees.  Only two
assertions get a majority of supporters among women.  One is that early retirement leads to a
lower pension, which is so by design.  The other is that early retirement benefits women more
than men.  From an "economic" point of view, then, the early retirement program could be
favorable to women.  Whether the adverse "social" implications are offset by the "economic"
implications  probably depends on the characteristics  of each worker.
While the subjective evaluation of early retirement is unobservable, the implicit transfer
of resources created by the program can be quantified. Figure 3 displays the average transfer for
all the SOE workers who would have been eligible for early retirement in the sample of the
1997-98 round of the VLSS, had decree 93/1998/ND-CP  been in force at that time.  To estimate
the average transfer, both the full pension at the normal retirement age and the reduced pension
at early retirement were computed for all eligible workers, taking into account their earnings and
work histories. The average transfer is the outcome of two effects of different sign.  On the one
hand, workers who retire early receive a pension during all the period below the legal retirement
age, up to a maximum of five years. On the other hand, they receive a lower pension over all the
years between their legal retirement age and their death.  The net transfers reported in Figure 3
are the present value of these two flows of opposite sign, discounted at an annual rate of 10
percent (in real terms), under different assumptions regarding life expectancy. Computations are
carried out  using the  Downsizing Options Simulation Exercise, or  DOSE,  an  Excel-based
18application that  incorporates the  lessons from a  broader research project  on public  sector
downsizing (see Rama, 1999).
Based on the results reported in Figure 3, the early retirement program introduced by
decree 93/1998/ND-CP  entails a net transfer of roughly 14 million dong for the average eligible
male worker, and 12 million dong for the average eligible female worker.  The ratio between
these two figures is very close to the ratio between the average earnings of male and female SOE
workers, according to Table 4.  From this perspective, the early retirement program of Vietnam
could be considered gender neutral.  However, this conclusion does not hold if the size of the
monetary transfer, rather than  its  relationship to  earnings, is  considered.  From  this  other
perspective, decree 93/1998/ND-CP is more advantageous  for male workers.
Another component of the assistance strategy considered by the government of Vietnam
is training.  While a variety of training programs already exist, their use may be intensified if
separated workers are given a training allowance or a training voucher.  These two possibilities
are currently under consideration as part of a broader separation package, to be discussed in the
next section.  The issue in this respect is whether the current supply of training programs in
Vietnam is well suited to the needs of female workers. While the ability of training programs to
actually improve the skills of trainees is in general unclear, there are groumds  to believe that the
choices offered in Vietnam do not suffer from a bias against women.
The Vietnam Women's Union has vocational training centers for skills like computer
operation,  English  language,  garment  manufacture,  knitting,  lace-making,  embroidery,
handicraft, beauty treatment and domestic skills.  Some of these skills may simply reflect typical
gender stereotypes; others appear to be well geared towards the needs of the labor market.  The
job training centers have often received initial funding from international agencies or from the
19national level of the Vietnam Women's Union, but they are largely self-supporting. Trainees are
required to pay a fee, usually ranging from 10 to 30 US dollars a month.  These vocational
training centers could play a key role in assisting female SOE workers who are separated from
their jobs.
6.  Gender  Biases  in  Separation  Packages
Cash compensation for job  loss is usually one of the most important components of
assistance strategies for redundant workers.  Compensation of this  sort takes the form  of a
separation package, generally based on individual characteristics such as salary in the SOE and
seniority on the job.  Although compensation  formulas do not explicitly discriminate by gender,
they may treat men and women differently.  As women earn less than men, they may get a
smaller amount of compensation.  Moreover, the present value of the loss in  earnings and
benefits from separation could be larger for women, at least according to the third proposition
from the literature on the gender impact of economic reforms.  Compensation formulas should
therefore be subject to scrutiny to assess whether they implicitly  discriminate by gender.
At present, separation packages in Vietnam are determined by the 1995 Labor Code.  At
the risk of simplifying, their formula is set by article 42, at half a month of salary per year of
service.  As  this  formula is  deemed  insufficiently generous to  handle mass  layoffs, other
alternatives are currently under discussion. A special fund to pay for potentially more expensive
separation packages has even been created, by decision 177/1999/QD-TTg.  Specialists from
several agencies and institutions, including the Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs
(MOLISA), the National Enterprise Reform Committee (NERC) and  the Vietnam's  General
20Confederation  of Labor (VGCL) have proposed specific formulas. But no decision had officially
been made when this article was written.  Consequently, rather than focusing on any of those
formulas, this article consider three standard packages.
The first package is based on earnings.  In this case, the amount of compensation Si
received by worker 'i' is a multiple of his or her total salary in the SOE, Wi:
Si=AW.  (1)
As parameter A increases, the amount of compensation  becomes more generous.  Parameter A
could be measured in months of total salary. The second package combines current earnings and
the number of years of service in the SOE, Y 1. In analytical terms, the amount of compensation
received by worker 'i' now verifies:
S.  =BW.Y.  (2)
1  1 
The generosity of this package hinges on parameter B, which can be measured in months of total
salary per year of service.  Finally, the third package is a lump-sum payment, not taking into
account any individual characteristic of the worker:
Si = C  (3)
In this case, parameter C directly indicates the amount of compensation received by the worker.
Parameter  C could be measured in thousand dong.
21Because not all SOE workers have the same earnings and the same number of years of
service, the three formulas would compensate them differently.  For instance, workers whose
earnings are higher than the average would receive a higher separation package under the first
formula  than  under  the  third  one.  Moreover,  different  workers  have  different  outside
alternatives. Those who have good job opportunities, or want to withdraw from the labor force,
may only need a small amount of compensation to be enticed to leave the SOE.  Those who
would like to continue working, but are relatively "unemployable", may require much larger
amounts.  Put  differently, each of the three packages may look "acceptable" to  some SOE
workers and "unacceptable" to others.  The issue is whether this acceptability is systematically
different for men and for women.
To address this issue, this article compares each of the three separation packages to the
present value of the loss from job separation, for each of the 45I SOE workers in the sample of
the 1997-98  round of the VLSS.  The present value of job loss is calculated using a methodology
initially proposed by Fiszbein (1994) and subsequently developed by Assaad (1999) and Chong
and Rama (2001). This methodology relies on an estimation of the alternative earnings of each
SOE worker, given his or her individual characteristics. In practical terms, an earnings function
like the one in the last column in Table 2 is used for this purpose.
When comparing these alternative eamings with the  actual earnings in the  SOE, it
appears that a majority of the workers would lose from separation. But there is a large group of
workers who apparently could earn more (in some cases, much more) out of the public sector
than in it.  The fact that these workers did not voluntarily leave their SOE suggests that they
attach a high value to non-cash benefits associated with their jobs,  such as health coverage,
entitlement to old-age pension, or low work effort.  However, some of the potential earnings
22gains are too large to be credible, implying that they are most likely due to measurement error.
The approach developed by Chong and Rama consists of getting rid of these "unrealistic" gains.
The highest predicted change in earnings, once these "unrealistic" cases have been removed, is
then used as an indicator of the cash value of the benefits associated with public sector jobs.
This cash equivalent is added to the actual earnings in the SOE to create an indicator of total
compensation.  The present value of the loss from separation is calculated as the difference
between total compensation in the SOE and alternative earnings, discoumted  over all the years
until the worker reaches the normal retirement age.
Computations are done using DOSE, and assuming that the top ten percent of expected
changes in earnings from job separation were too high to be "realistic".  Under this assumption,
the benefits associated with an SOE job are worth an additional 56.1 percent of the total salary
for male workers, and an additional 59.8 percent for female workers.  If only the top eight
percent had been discarded as unrealistic, the gender gap in the valuation of benefits would have
been larger, as the corresponding figures would have been 64.9 and 74.6 percent respectively. A
higher figure for female workers is consistent with the fact that some of the benefits that are
available in  SOEs, but not  necessarily elsewhere in Vietnam, are especially appreciated by
women. This is obviously the case with maternity leave.
Figures 3, 4 and 5 report the "acceptance rates" of each of the three packages for different
values of paramneters  A, B and C.  The acceptance rate is the fraction of the SOE workers for
whom the separation package would exceed the present value of the estimated loss from job
separation. The range of variation of parameters A, B, and C is such that the highest acceptance
rate is close to 20 percent for all three packages. However, the average compensation per worker
needed to attain the same acceptance rate is different in all three cases.  Overall, the separation
23package that combines salary and years of service tends to be the most expensive.  The package
based on earnings, in Figure 3, displays consistently higher acceptance rates for male workers.
At the other end, the package based on a lump-sum payment, in Figure 5, is more attractive to
female workers, and increasingly so as it becomes more generous.  The package combining
earnings  and  seniority  occupies  an  intermediate  position,  as  revealed  by  the  multiple
intersections  of the solid and the broken lines. Based on these figures, it is clear that a separation
package involving an important lump-sum component is less likely to penalize women.
7.  Conclusions
While the massive downsizing of the early 1990s affected women disproportionately,  the
new reform program of Vietnam should not have the same gender bias.  Employment in SOEs
has been shaped by a decade of increased exposure to market competition. In sectors of activity
where Vietnam has a comparative advantage, especially in light industries such as footwear and
leather, or textile and garments, female employment is dominant.  Over-staffing in these sectors
is not dramatic.  On the other hand, in the sectors of activity that had been favored by central
planning, such as transportation, or mining, only a small fraction of the workers are female. It is
in these sectors where over-staffing is most prevalent.  The nature of the contracts used in
different sectors of activity is also indicative of actual demand for female workers.  Short-term
and temporary contracts are more common in sectors where female employment is dominant,
whereas long-term and open-ended contracts characterize the sectors where male employment is
dominant. Overall, it appears that in the early 2000s, labor redundancy in Vietnam has become
essentially a male problem.
24The assistance programs that are currently in place to help redundant workers do not
seem to be strongly biased against women either.  The net transfer of resources from the current
early retirement program is similar for both sexes, if measured as a multiple of labor earnings. It
is higher for men when measured in value terms, but this does not necessarily mean that women
are penalized.  It has been claimed that early retirement is detrimental to female workers, as it
prevents them from reaching high levels in the echelons of the SOEs they work for.  However,
according to the only survey available in this respect, this claim is nolt  universally supported.
While a large fraction of female respondents agree that early retirement affects the social status
of women, an absolute majority of them says that it is economically beneficial for women.  The
current supply of training services is also quite well geared to female workers.
Whether separation packages for separated SOE workers will treat women fairly is still
an open issue, as no decision has been made in this respect. The simulations done for this article
show that the acceptance rate for some of the standard packages could differ systematically for
men and  women.  Separation packages based on  a  multiple of  current earnings would be
preferred by men, whereas those based on a lump-sum payment would be preferred by women.
Packages defined in months of salary per year of service occupy an intermediate position, but
they would be more expensive from the government's perspective.  Overall, these simulations
suggest that  including an  important lump-sum component in the  formula of  the separation
package would be key to ensure that separated female workers are not penalized, relative to
separated male workers.
Voluntariness would be an additional safeguard. This safeguard is already present in the
early retirement program of Vietnam.  Redundant workers who qualify for early retirement can
make their own judgement, and decide whether they want to take it or not.  Depending on the
25amount of resources the government of Vietnam is willing to commit to  cushion the social
impact of the reforms, the separation of many SOE workers who are not  eligible for early
retirement could be voluntary too.  If packages were generous, the number of workers willing to
resign could be large enough to deal with most of the labor redundancy problem.  It is still
possible that among those who accept to retire early, or to take a separation offer, men benefit
more than women.  But  voluntariness ensures that the wellbeing of  redundant female SOE
workers is not reduced (at least, ex-ante).
Last but not least, the reform program of Vietnam may also affect the wellbeing of
women who are not bound to lose their SOE jobs.  The experience of the 1990s showed that the
reform program was associated with a substantial reduction of the "unexplained" gap in eamings
between men and women, both in SOEs and in the private sector.  Moreover, a reduction in the
size of the state sector should be associated with an expansion of employment in the private
sector. Data on large establishments  reveals that the highest proportion of female workers can be
found in the private sector, and the lowest in SOEs. The reform program of Vietnam could thus
increase the opportunities for women to become salaried workers.  The combination of a smaller
gender gap and a potential expansion in salaried employment suggests that the reform program
of Vietnam is to the advantage of women.
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28Table 1
Working  Age  Population  by Economic  Activity
(Figures in percent)
1992-93  1997-98
Status  Female  Male  Total  Female  Male  Total
Active  83.86  87.85  85.74  85.44  86.92  86.14
Employed  80.91  84.49  82.59  83.73  84.79  84.23
Unemployed  2.95  3.37  3.15  1.71  2.13  1.91
Not Active  16.14  12.15  14.26  14.56  13.08  13.86
Attending School  2.12  3.71  2.87  6.27  8.58  7.37
Housekeeping  3.97  0.22  2.20  3.71  0.23  2.05
Other  10.06  8.21  9.19  4.58  4.28  4.43
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00
Source: Bales (2000). Working age population includes all persons aged 15 to 64.Table 2
Determinants  of Wage  Earnings
Dependent variable:
Log of total earnings in main occupation
1992-93  1997-98
Explanatory  variables  SOEs  Private  SOEs  Private
Female (yes = 1)  -0.3399 ***  -0.4919 ***  -0.2047 ***  -0.3025 ***
(-5.222)  (-10.329)  (-4.810)  (-8.096)
Education (in years)  0.0272 ***  0.0234 ***  0.0363 ***  0.0398 ***
(2.737)  (2.755)  (3.575)  (6.031)
Work experience (in years)  0.0017  0.0229 ***  0.0001  0.0175 ***
(0.146)  (2.846)  (0.387)  (3.097)
Work experience squared  0.0003  -0.0005 ***  0.0001  -0.0005 ***
(0.922)  (-3.498)  (0.387)  (-4.976)
Married (yes = 1)  0.0938  -0.0955  0.1847 ***  0.0990 **
(0.962)  (1.257)  (3.196)  (2.135)
Household  head (yes = 1)  -0.0320  0.0548  0.0474  -0.0043
(-0.419)  (0.843)  (0.777)  (-0.093)
Ethnic and religion dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Urban dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Regional dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Community characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
R-squared  0.376  0.217  0.370  0.284
F test  330.76  14.90  20.57  17.53
Number of observations  340  1342  566  1921
Source: Regression coefficients estimated by ordinary least squares, based on individual records
from wage earners in the Vietnam Living Standards Survey. Values in parentheses are t-
statistics.  Significant coefficients at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level are indicated by one,
two and three asterisks respectivelyTable 3
Public  Sector  Retrenchment  in Vietnam  in  1991
(Figures in percent of workers who switched  jobs)
Activity at the time of the survey
Up to 12 months after  job switch  Unpaid work  Paid work  Seeking  work  Out of labor force
Previous  job in  Female  47.5  8.8  1.3  42.5
Public sector  Male  52.8  11.3  0.0  35.8
Previous  job in  Female  21.5  10.4  2.4  65.7
Other sector  Male  23.1  27.5  3.4  46.0
More than 12 months after job switch  Unpaid work  Paid work  Seeking work  Out of labor force
Previous job in  Female  74.0  14.3  1.3  10.4
Public sector  Male  70.0  22.4  0.4  7.2
Previous job in  Female  71.3  18.1  0.3  10.3
Other sector  Male  63.9  27.3  0.7  8.1
Source: Adapted from Rodgers (1999).Table 4
Employment  in  State-Owned  Enterprises
Variable  Female  Male  All
Age (in years)  35.0  37.0  36.0
Married (in percent)  58.5  71.7  66.1
Household size (number of persons)  5.3  5.1  5.2
Education (in years)  11.0  11.2  11.1
Vocational training (in years)  0.7  0.8  0.8
Seniority in SOE (in years)  10.7  9.5  10.0
Basic salary in SOE (000 dongs per year)  7,311  8,652  8,078
Total earmings  in SOE (000 dongs per year)  8,544  10,456  9,638
Total earnings in all jobs (000 dongs per year)  10,000  12,568  11,469
Number of workers (in percent)  42.8  57.2  100.0
Source: Refers to workers whose main occupation was in a state-owned enterprise at the time of
the  1998 Vietnam  Living Standards  Survey, according to  the  Downsizing Options
Simulation Exercise (DOSE) for Vietnam.  Earnings figures are adjusted to December
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